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How I Built This with Guy Raz

Pressbox and Tide Cleaners: Vijen Patel. The $1.99 Gamble That Built a National Brand

with Vijan Patel

Published October 6, 2025
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About This Episode

Host Guy Raz interviews entrepreneur Vijan Patel about founding Pressbox, a dry cleaning and laundry startup built around 24/7 locker access in residential buildings. Patel explains how he and co-founder Drew McKenna bootstrapped the company, focused relentlessly on unit economics and quality, and expanded across multiple U.S. cities before being acquired by Procter & Gamble and folded into Tide Cleaners. He also describes the burnout of running a 24/7 service business, the competitive battles with venture-backed rivals and P&G itself, and his current focus on investing in "boring" but essential, asset-heavy businesses through his fund, the 81 Collection.

Topics Covered

Entrepreneurship Business growth and scaling Bootstrapping Scrappiness in business Unit economics Venture capital Private equity Branding and naming Work ethic Burnout

Disclaimer: We provide independent summaries of podcasts and are not affiliated with or endorsed in any way by any podcast or creator. All podcast names and content are the property of their respective owners. The views and opinions expressed within the podcasts belong solely to the original hosts and guests and do not reflect the views or positions of Summapod.

Quick Takeaways

  • Pressbox was built by targeting a "boring" but fragmented, low-tech industry and redesigning its economics through 24/7 locker access in residential buildings.
  • Patel and McKenna bootstrapped the company, taking large personal pay cuts and working seven days a week while focusing obsessively on unit economics and customer retention.
  • The company's dense network of locker locations enabled far more efficient delivery routes than pickup-and-drop-off competitors, proving more sustainable than heavily funded rivals.
  • Quality control and retention drove the decision to vertically integrate with their own plant, which materially improved margins but created new staffing and operational challenges.
  • Procter & Gamble first competed directly with Pressbox via Tide Spin, then ultimately acquired the business, rebranding it as Tide Cleaners and scaling the model nationally.
  • Patel now runs a venture fund focused on asset-heavy, people-heavy "boring" businesses that traditional software-focused VCs often overlook.

Podcast Notes

Introduction and Overview of the Pressbox Story

Setting up the dry cleaning problem and the $1.99 shirt

Guy frames dry cleaning through the memorable price of a $1.99 shirt[4:15]
• He notes that even though shirts haven't cost $1.99 to clean for a long time, that price is stuck in many consumers' heads
• That price point symbolizes razor-thin margins, struggling mom-and-pop shops, and inconvenient hours for customers rushing to drop off and pick up clothing
Introduction of Pressbox and its core idea[5:11]
• In 2013, Patel saw the $1.99 shirt as an opportunity, not out of love for dry cleaning but for the underlying numbers
• He and co-founder Drew McKenna created Pressbox by placing lockers in Chicago apartment buildings where residents could drop clothes 24/7 and pick them up cleaned a few days later
• Removing storefront rent and on-site labor dramatically improved margins on paper compared with traditional dry cleaners
Outcome of the Pressbox journey[6:02]
• Pressbox expanded beyond Chicago into other states and caught the attention of Procter & Gamble, a major competitor
• P&G acquired Pressbox, folded it into Tide Cleaners, and the service now operates in nearly 1,200 locations nationwide

Why this "boring" industry story matters

Guy contextualizes Pressbox among other "boring" but successful companies[6:31]
• He compares Pressbox to brands like SpotHero and Kinko's, describing dry cleaning and laundry as a "boring" industry rather than a flashy tech product
• Guy notes that Patel later started a VC fund in Chicago specifically to support such boring startups

Guest Background: Consulting and Private Equity

Early life and McKinsey experience

Patel's upbringing and first job[6:36]
• Patel grew up in Chicago in the 1990s and, after graduating from Notre Dame, joined McKinsey as a consultant
Impact of the 2008 financial crisis on his cohort[6:48]
• He joined the 2008 class at McKinsey, where expectations were high for glamorous case work and travel
• Instead, the economic downturn shifted work toward cost-cutting projects in less glamorous locales like Iowa
• As a Midwesterner, he was grateful simply to have a job, but he believes his cohort's satisfaction level was among the lowest ever
• He estimates that of the 55 business analysts in his cohort, around 30 later became entrepreneurs
Frustration with ending work in PowerPoint[7:39]
• Patel says that at McKinsey, all their work culminated in a PowerPoint presentation, leaving him feeling that something was missing
• That experience planted a seed that he wanted to be closer to implementation and actual change, not just analysis

Move to San Francisco and private equity

Role in a consumer-focused private equity firm[7:52]
• After nearly three years at McKinsey, Patel moved to San Francisco around 2011 to join a private equity firm as an associate focusing on consumer deals
• His job was to vet potential acquisitions, building models and decks for investment decisions
Missed investments and realizing he was mediocre at PE[8:44]
• He recalls looking at brands like Brookside and Sahale Nuts and missing opportunities to invest because the firm overanalyzed and lacked gut feel for consumer businesses
• Over two years, he did not complete any deals and later estimated that basket of companies might today be worth more than $5 billion
• He concluded he was "mediocre at private equity at best" because the role required long hours in front of a computer, whereas he wanted to be with people and drive change
Realizing he needed to start a company[9:40]
• This mismatch led to an "aha" moment that he needed to "go be myself" and actually build something rather than just analyze it

San Francisco tech boom and Patel's "bubble"

Disconnect from the startup wave[9:10]
• Guy asks whether Patel was paying attention to emerging companies like Uber, Airbnb, and Slack during that era in San Francisco
• Patel says he would like to say yes but admits he was largely insulated in a "private equity bubble" in a building that housed many PE firms
• He approached starting a company with a private equity mindset, focusing on industry structure rather than dreams or passion

Finding the "Least Worst" Startup Idea: Dry Cleaning Lockers

Choosing an industry analytically rather than by passion

Defining criteria for an attractive industry[9:50]
• Patel looked for a highly fragmented industry with low technology adoption and weak or no branding
• He jokes that those criteria should have led him to taxis, but he ended up with dry cleaning instead
Evaluating multiple "least worst" ideas[11:00]
• He describes the process as picking the "least worst idea" among options he had modest passion for
• Other ideas included chai packets from India and dentures, but dry cleaning ultimately stood out
Personal pain point with dry cleaning[11:30]
• His private equity firm required business formal attire, so he owned many suits, ties, and shirts and found visiting the dry cleaner a major pain point
• Working long hours meant the only realistic time to drop clothes off was Saturday, when he preferred to see friends instead of running that errand

Initial validation through an "investment deck"

Building a 12-page investment-style deck for the idea[12:10]
• Over six months, Patel's eventual co-founder Drew McKenna flew to San Francisco, and Patel created a 12-page "investment deck" evaluating the concept like a private equity deal
• They presented this deck to about 100 people to solicit feedback, treating it as an investment pitch rather than a classic startup pitch
Overwhelming skepticism and family reaction[12:27]
• Around 90% of the roughly 100 people they spoke to said it was an awful idea
• When Patel told his mother he was leaving private equity to start a dry cleaner, she cried and asked why he would do that
• Despite skepticism from VCs and family, they used the feedback to identify potential failure points and proactively plan mitigations

Understanding the traditional dry cleaning model

Separation between storefronts and cleaning plants[12:36]
• Guy explains that most dry cleaners don't clean on site; they are storefronts served by central facilities
• This means customers' belief in a specific "best" neighborhood dry cleaner is often misplaced because many use the same plant
Margin structure and why it looks unattractive[13:42]
• Patel says typical dry cleaners operate at about 15% margins, but when you subtract the owner's salary, it's effectively 0%
• Many people warned him against entering such a low-margin industry, but he saw a way to redesign the cost structure

Designing the locker-based, 24/7 model

24/7 access as the consumer hook[12:59]
• Inspired partly by a small company called Laundry Locker, they envisioned a model where customers could access lockers 24/7 using a fob to enter buildings
• Patel and McKenna thought the main consumer advantage was convenience-being able to drop off or pick up clothes at any time, including 2 a.m.
Cost savings from eliminating storefront rent and staff[13:28]
• By using lockers instead of storefronts, they could remove rent and on-site labor, which Patel believed could take margins from 15% to around 40%
Target customer and light-tech approach[14:26]
• Initially they targeted bankers, doctors, and other professionals with long hours who couldn't meet typical dry cleaner hours
• Tech was only about 20% of the model; at first they relied on SMS and physical tools rather than sophisticated apps
• To handle customers' desire to point out stains and give special instructions, they placed pen, paper, and stickers at locations for note-taking

Co-founder choice and move to Chicago

Meeting competitor Rinse and differentiating models[16:19]
• Patel notes that Ajay, CEO of Rinse, started a dry clean business the same month he did, and mutual friends connected them in 2013
• Rinse pursued a pickup-and-drop-off model, while Pressbox chose a hardware-based locker model; they met once and then didn't reconnect for several years
Selecting Drew McKenna as co-founder[17:30]
• Patel and McKenna knew each other from Notre Dame but were not extremely close before founding the company
• They ran MBTI personality tests and found they were exact opposites, which Patel liked because it meant complementary strengths with shared values
• They "dated" as co-founders over three to four months before committing, to ensure their working styles meshed
Why Chicago instead of San Francisco[18:37]
• McKenna was already in Chicago, and both founders had roots there, including relationships with real estate owners
• Patel notes he may have been the only founder to move from San Francisco to Chicago to start a company, but they judged the community and hiring environment there as an advantage

Early Execution in Chicago and Achieving Product-Market Fit

Initial fundraising attempts and VC reactions

Chicago VCs see it as a lifestyle business[20:44]
• Upon moving back to Chicago in 2013, Patel pitched the idea to the 5-7 VCs active there at the time
• The common response was that he was building a "nice small business" or "lifestyle business," a term he says still hurts
• Every VC passed, but Patel and McKenna were having so much fun that they continued anyway, relying on their own belief that the opportunity was worth pursuing

Validating demand with street surveys and math

Sidewalk table surveys to gauge interest[22:10]
• Before buying any equipment, they set up tables at main intersections in Chicago to survey passersby
• They asked if people would use the service if a locker location were placed at their office or near their home
• Their initial hypothesis was that offices would be the best locations, and early math was based on that assumption
Unit economics based on average monthly spend[21:52]
• Research suggested the average person spent about $40 per month on dry cleaning and laundry
• They calculated how many customers per location they would need to cover costs and make the model work
Bootstrapped capital and locker investment[23:12]
• Patel had saved about $120,000 from McKinsey and private equity, and McKenna had a similar amount
• They also raised about $100,000 of debt from their parents, giving them roughly $340,000 total to launch
• Approximately 80% of that capital went into purchasing lockers, which Patel calls "dumb lockers" with digital locks

Design of the first lockers and user flow

Simple hardware with SMS-based communication[23:29]
• Lockers had a 4-digit digital lock and were numbered; for example, a building might have eight lockers labeled 1-8
• Customers would drop clothes in a locker and send a text message with the locker number; the system used Twilio to route messages to the team
• They intentionally kept the system simple and low-cost rather than investing heavily in smart locker technology
Customer onboarding and friction vs. alternatives[24:52]
• Customers had to visit the website to create an account and enter credit card details before using the service
• Patel acknowledges that, by today's standards, this seems like a lot of friction, but still less painful than going to a traditional dry cleaner

Pricing strategy and the importance of the $1.99 shirt

Convenience first, but anchored by a key price point[25:08]
• He says convenience mattered more than price overall, but one price point was crucial: the cost to clean a dress shirt
• Everyone knows that price, he says, and cites $1.99 per shirt as the benchmark lodged in consumers' minds
• Pressbox marketed heavily around that shirt price, even starting at $1.79 per shirt to undercut competitors and drive volume
• They also offered $5 for a dress as a clear, simple price point

First locations: storefront plus failed office push

Opening a hybrid storefront/office[26:35]
• They opened a physical storefront in Chicago's Lakeview/Lincoln Park area, with lockers in the lobby and front, and used the back two-thirds as their office
Attempting to place lockers in offices and gyms[32:06]
• Leveraging connections from Notre Dame's endowment and family/friends, they got introductions to building decision-makers, especially for office buildings and gyms
• They initially believed offices would be a strong channel, but discovered that people did not want to bring dry cleaning to work
• This misjudgment forced them to reconsider where lockers should be located to maximize adoption

Pivot to residential buildings and finding product-market fit

Realization about proximity to the wardrobe[32:34]
• They learned that the "path of least resistance" was proximity to where people keep their clothes-their homes-rather than workplaces
• Being close to the wardrobe, and even the specific location within an apartment building, greatly increased the likelihood of customers using the service
Breakthrough with 1225 Old Town[33:46]
• Around month eight, they targeted 1225 Old Town, then Chicago's hottest property with the highest rent per square foot and a 20-35-year-old target demographic
• The building said no for five months, but many friends and friends-of-friends lived there and repeatedly emailed the property manager on Pressbox's behalf
• After about nine emails, the property manager finally agreed to meet, and they secured 10 lockers (five stacked over five) in the building
• Once they landed 1225 Old Town, the model started working, and they quickly broke even at that location
Guerrilla marketing in lobbies to build trust[34:02]
• They set up tables in lobbies, similar to their earlier street surveys, to meet residents face to face and explain the service
• They realized people are entrusting their favorite clothes, which give them confidence, so seeing real people behind the service was critical for trust
• Patel estimates he personally hosted around 1,000 lobby events over the course of their entrepreneurial journey; these became a primary conversion tactic

Unit economics and path to profitability per location

Amenity positioning and free rent[35:27]
• Pressbox pitched itself as an amenity to building owners, promising potential higher rent or longer tenant retention
• In return, buildings allowed lockers without charging rent, and could advertise "on-site dry cleaning" in their marketing
Cost structure per location[35:33]
• It cost about $5,000 to set up a location, mainly the locker and installation
• They assumed an average user would spend $40 per month; with 25 users, a location would generate about $1,000 in monthly revenue
• Roughly 50% of revenue went to the cleaning plant, plus transportation and line items like parking tickets, which became a notable P&L category
• Their only marketing expense was flyers, keeping other costs minimal
Break-even metrics and early traction[36:16]
• They calculated break-even at about 26 active customers per location, measured as recurring monthly users
• At 1225 Old Town, they reached break-even in six weeks, a key moment when Patel says they found product-market fit
• Within about 15 months of starting, they hit $80,000 in monthly revenue, which translates to roughly $1 million in annual revenue

Operational setup and early team

Working with multiple cleaners, then consolidating[37:14]
• Initially, they worked with three or four different cleaning plants, but that became an operational headache
• They later found a plant on Goose Island that served many hotels and had capacity, becoming their main supplier for much of Chicago
Who ran routes and handled logistics[39:19]
• In the first year, Patel and McKenna handled many routes themselves while also hiring two key early employees: David for operations with McKenna, and Ariana for marketing and sales with Patel
• The team of four operated seven days a week, which Patel later calls one of their worst decisions; founders took weekend routes while David handled weekdays

Scaling in Chicago using 1225 Old Town as social proof

Real estate amenity matching and snowball growth[39:47]
• Once in 1225 Old Town, they could tell any building, "we work with 1225 Old Town," which carried weight in the real estate community
• Because building owners needed to match amenities with competitors across the street, Pressbox's presence in a marquee building triggered demand elsewhere
• They began adding about eight new locations per month and eventually reached about 250 locations in Chicago over three years
Margins and founders' compensation[40:18]
• Pressbox achieved EBITDA margins of roughly 20-25%, a notable improvement over traditional dry cleaners
• Despite prior earnings of almost $300,000 annually in private equity, Patel took a $40,000 salary for five years, as did McKenna

Scaling, Competition, and Vertical Integration

Confronting well-funded competitors like Washio

Fear of Washio entering Chicago[41:24]
• Washio, a heavily funded competitor with about $18 million raised and celebrity investors like Ashton Kutcher, was the "gorilla" they feared most
• Around year two, Washio chose Chicago as its third market; Patel says he barely slept that month from paranoia about competing with a much better-funded rival
Outcome of direct competition with Washio[41:40]
• One month after Washio's launch in Chicago, Pressbox's revenue had dropped only about 2%
• This small impact convinced Patel that fundraising totals didn't necessarily determine success if unit economics and customer satisfaction were solid
• Washio eventually shut down in 2016, validating Pressbox's focus on a more efficient model

Expansion to Washington, D.C., and its challenges

Why D.C. looked attractive on paper[41:44]
• Pressbox expanded to Washington, D.C., attracted by its heavy dry cleaning usage and significant new construction
Two major factors they misjudged[42:40]
• They overlooked that no building in D.C. can be taller than the Capitol statue, which meant lower density-problematic since their model relied on highly dense clusters
• They also underestimated the difficulty of staffing, as they were competing with the federal government for hourly labor, which drove driver costs 60% higher than in Chicago
• Employee churn in D.C. was about twice the rate of Chicago, making operations tougher, though Patel says the market was still profitable due to their frugality

Decision to vertically integrate with their own plant

Importance of retention and quality control[43:41]
• Using 1225 Old Town as an example with 220 units, Patel notes that losing even one customer permanently reduces the serviceable addressable market to 219 people
• Because they served a fixed pool in each building, maintaining high quality to maximize retention was critical; they couldn't easily replace lost customers
• Working with an external supplier created friction: staff shortages at the plant could delay cleaning by six hours, causing Pressbox to deliver lower quality service and take the reputational hit
• Patel calculated that the difference between 98% and 96% monthly retention, compounded over time, meant ending two years with about 78% vs. 55% of customers still active
Building their own facility in Skokie[48:13]
• Around the three-year mark, with operations in Chicago, D.C., and Nashville, they decided to "insource" cleaning by building their own plant north of Chicago
• Their bank account swung from positive $300,000 to negative $400,000 every two weeks due to payroll, underscoring cash pressure before they took on new debt
• At this time they had about 45-50 employees, including transportation, inventory, marketing, and sales teams
• They financed about 80% of plant equipment using debt and asset-backed lending, leasing the warehouse rather than buying it
• Building the plant required obtaining licenses, arranging utilities, and hiring an architect because the facility had never housed a dry cleaner before
Margin improvements and staffing challenges[50:03]
• By removing the external middleman, they no longer paid 50% of revenue to a wholesaler; instead they covered their own staff and rent
• Both their gross margin (around 50%) and EBITDA margin (around 25%) improved by roughly 10 percentage points after vertical integration
• However, staffing pressers and plant workers proved difficult; job postings on Indeed and Craigslist generated almost no applicants
• They learned to advertise in the Spanish-language newspaper Hoy, after which Patel's phone "wouldn't stop ringing," and they fully staffed the plant within two to three months

Riding the "amenity war" and new construction wave

Getting spec'd into new buildings' architectural plans[52:34]
• Around 2016, there were about 55 new buildings under construction in Chicago, and Patel says Pressbox ultimately got into 53 of them
• Rather than pitching property managers or tenants, they went directly to building owners already using Pressbox and asked to be spec'd into new developments' architectural drawings
• This strategy placed lockers in highly visible, high-traffic spots and reduced later sales friction
Creating behavior in new buildings vs. changing it[52:54]
• They discovered that revenue per unit (per apartment) was about twice as high in new construction buildings compared with existing ones
• Upon move-in, residents received a gift box costing about $7, containing a bag, water bottle, handwritten note, and a flyer with pricing
• Because people were already setting up internet and other services, they were more open to adopting Pressbox as a default habit, rather than switching from an existing dry cleaner later

Strategic Competition with Procter & Gamble and Exit

Entrance of Tide Spin and comparison of models

P&G launches Tide Spin in Chicago[54:06]
• In 2016, Procter & Gamble launched Tide Spin, a competing service, in Chicago
• Pressbox was already accustomed to competition from players like Washio, so Tide Spin's arrival felt like "same old, same old" in terms of competitive anxiety
Unit economics of pickup/drop-off vs. lockers[54:32]
• Tide Spin initially used a pickup-and-drop-off model; Patel calculates such a model allows only 4-6 transactions per hour per driver
• Pressbox's dense locker network enabled about 26 transactions per hour per driver, giving them a significant unit-economics advantage despite similar gross margins in cleaning
• Even though Tide Spin orders were larger on average (around $80 vs Pressbox's $40), the arithmetic still made profitability difficult at low transaction counts
• Pressbox scheduled drivers from 5 a.m. to 9 a.m., when roads were clearer, maximizing route efficiency

Tide Spin copies the locker model and attempts displacement

Locker competition and building owners' decisions[55:56]
• After realizing pickup/drop-off economics didn't work, P&G shifted Tide Spin toward lockers, directly competing with Pressbox in many of the same buildings
• They targeted new construction as well, but Pressbox typically won bids due to its track record and existing relationships with developers and owners
• In existing buildings, owners questioned why they would remove functioning Pressbox lockers and replace them with Tide lockers, especially since Pressbox service was performing well

National expansion strategy and ongoing bootstrapping

Following developers into new markets[57:02]
• By 2016, developers who worked with Pressbox in Chicago were building in D.C. and later Denver, inviting Pressbox to "come with them" into new cities
• They also expanded into Nashville, Philadelphia, and Dallas, often with a head start in those markets due to existing developer relationships
Reluctance to raise capital and consequences[1:00:05]
• Despite growing traction and facing a giant like P&G, Patel and McKenna carried a chip on their shoulder because early investors had rejected them
• They resisted raising outside capital for too long, which Patel now views as a regret; his computer homepage was his bank account, an unhealthy sign of constant cash anxiety
• He says they spent so much time working in the business that they rarely had time to work on the business strategically

Framing the exit: strategic buyer from day one

Early recognition that a strategic sale was the likely path[1:01:15]
• Patel says their original 12-page investment deck highlighted a concern about exit options: they knew they could not IPO and likely would not be attractive to traditional private equity buyers
• They concluded early that a strategic buyer would be the logical exit, and viewed P&G's entrance into the space as a positive signal
Keeping competitors close[1:01:43]
• Patel made a practice of maintaining relationships with competitors-including the Tide Spin team-thinking that either Pressbox might buy them or be bought by them
• He recalls declining a request from Tide Spin to tour Pressbox's plant but still participating in conversations whenever P&G wanted to understand their model

Funding term sheets and P&G's offers to buildings

Pressbox finally pursues outside funding[1:02:37]
• By around 2017, they realized they'd have no negotiating power with P&G without another option; they sought to raise about $5 million and received multiple term sheets
P&G tries to buy loyalty from building owners[1:03:11]
• P&G started offering building owners capital (roughly in the $10,000-$25,000 range) to switch from Pressbox to Tide-branded lockers
• From P&G's perspective, this was part of a build-or-buy calculation: should they invest more in Tide Spin or acquire Pressbox?
• According to Patel, all of their partners except one refused these offers, a powerful testament to the trust they had built over five to six years

Burnout, Life After Exit, and Investing in "Boring" Businesses

Negotiating with P&G and deciding to sell

Lowball offers and a decisive counter-move[1:04:09]
• P&G lowballed Pressbox with acquisition offers multiple times, even as Pressbox had term sheets from other investors
• After a third lowball, McKenna, frustrated, quickly signed a funding term sheet and sent it to P&G with a note that they looked forward to competing head-to-head
• Patel's wife asked whether they should at least discuss the decision first, noting that P&G's offer would still be life-changing money
• He admires McKenna's principled stance that they had built something of real value and should not undersell it, even if their response was perhaps too hasty
Final agreement and structure of the deal[1:04:07]
• P&G asked for 24 hours and came back with a revised offer; Pressbox ultimately decided to sell
• Patel and McKenna became P&G employees, and Pressbox was rebranded to Tide Cleaners after a brief internal debate over which brand was stronger
• The Tide Spin team was folded into Pressbox's operations, and Patel and McKenna were put in charge of P&G's urban division for Tide Cleaners, with the Pressbox model going national

Founder burnout and why the sale felt necessary

Nashville night as a turning point[1:06:11]
• Patel recalls a rainy night in Nashville walking to an event to sell dry cleaning, when he suddenly realized he didn't want to be doing this at age 45
• By that time they had been working roughly 1,000 days in a row, operating seven days a week, 24/7, and the toll of bootstrapping was enormous
Personal sacrifices and financial stress[1:07:04]
• Patel says he was making $40,000 while friends in private equity were becoming partners and earning over $1 million per year
• He missed friends' weddings and stopped getting invited to birthday parties because he often didn't show up due to exhaustion
• His wife, a medical resident at the time, would suggest going out on Saturday nights, but he was too exhausted to socialize
• He called his dad at one point asking if, if the business failed, he could borrow money "to start life again," not to start another business
• Their first trip together as a couple was to Kansas City, chosen because they found cheap Spirit Airlines flights and a low-cost hotel; the whole trip cost about $500
• He says he didn't know what the end state of their life would be and that they were "incredibly burned out" when P&G entered the picture
Why P&G was a lifeline[1:08:22]
• Patel believes they could have sold to another dry cleaner eventually, but such a buyer would not have matched P&G's terms or capital resources
• Selling to P&G not only changed their financial situation but also offered relief from the brutally demanding bootstrap lifestyle

Life at P&G and timing of COVID

Two-year stint and impact on employees[1:09:21]
• Patel and McKenna stayed at P&G for two years after the July 2018 acquisition; P&G wanted Patel to stay longer, and he says he had a great experience
• He enjoyed returning to some of his old consulting skills, like making PowerPoint slides, and their employees received substantial pay raises
• Patel and McKenna also began earning "real" salaries that allowed Patel to pay rent without dipping into savings
Final earn-out check just before COVID[1:09:36]
• Their last earn-out check arrived in March 2020, just as COVID-19 began severely impacting dry cleaning volumes worldwide
• Patel describes being in a "sanctuary" in Chicago with capital and free time while the world-and the dry cleaning business in particular-was being hit hard

Founding the 81 Collection: Investing in "boring" businesses

Recognizing a gap in early-stage capital[1:10:34]
• After taking some months off, Patel founded a venture firm called the 81 Collection, focused on companies like Pressbox in "boring" industries
• He cites research showing about 3,400 early-stage investing firms exist, around 90% of which focus on software
• This leaves only 10-20% of firms to fund critical non-software sectors, and roughly half of those firms are not even active
• Patel observes that most investors seek asset-light, employee-light, cloud-based unicorns, whereas Pressbox was the opposite-asset-heavy and people-heavy
Social impact of growing "boring" companies[1:10:25]
• He notes that many early employees who started at Pressbox making $15-$20 per hour eventually earned $50,000-$75,000 per year as the business grew
• Patel attended their weddings and saw some buy homes or start their own businesses, moving from lower class into middle class
• He points out that we are in the greatest economic period in global history, but profits are too concentrated among a small number of people, and he sees his fund as addressing that imbalance

Examples of "boring" sectors and opportunities

High-margin pet cremation investment[1:11:56]
• Patel mentions an investment the fund made in a pet cremation business, where they were "blown away" by approximately 80% EBITDA margins
Other sectors ripe for innovation[1:13:03]
• He lists examples such as dentistry, property tax appeals, and pediatric services as industries with strong fundamentals but little early-stage innovation
• Many of these sectors are oversubscribed by private equity at the buyout stage but undersubscribed by technology and innovation at the early stage
• Patel argues that key services like doctors' offices and morticians are often 40 years behind best practices, and modernizing them can significantly lift local economies

Perspective on luck vs. hard work

Rebalancing credit between effort and timing[1:13:44]
• Patel says he once believed that 80% of success was due to hard work, smarts, and grit
• He now thinks that 80% of their success came from luck and timing, including the multifamily housing boom, new construction wave, and favorable exit timing

Lessons Learned

Actionable insights and wisdom you can apply to your business, career, and personal life.

1

Design your business around clear unit economics and validate demand with simple, low-cost experiments before committing major resources.

Reflection Questions:

  • • What are the key unit economics in my current or planned business, and have I calculated them down to the level of a single customer or location?
  • • How could I test my idea with a simple, scrappy experiment (like a survey table or basic prototype) before investing significant time and capital?
  • • Where am I assuming demand without evidence, and what specific experiment could I run in the next 30 days to validate or refute that assumption?
2

Operational efficiency and smart infrastructure choices can be a more durable advantage than fundraising totals or flashy technology.

Reflection Questions:

  • • In my business, where do inefficiencies (such as routing, staffing, or scheduling) quietly erode margins that I could improve with better design?
  • • How might rethinking the physical or process infrastructure of my operation make me dramatically more efficient than competitors with similar products?
  • • What is one concrete operational change I could test this quarter to increase throughput or reduce cost per transaction without compromising quality?
3

Customer trust and retention compound over time, so controlling quality-critical parts of the value chain can be worth the complexity of vertical integration.

Reflection Questions:

  • • Which parts of my value chain, if they fail, directly damage customer trust and long-term retention?
  • • How could bringing a critical step in-house (or building tighter control over it) affect my retention, margins, and customer experience over the next few years?
  • • What small step could I take this year to gain more control over a key quality driver, even if I'm not ready for full vertical integration?
4

Bootstrapping builds discipline and resilience, but refusing outside capital out of pride can limit your ability to work on the business instead of just in it.

Reflection Questions:

  • • Where might my identity or pride be causing me to avoid helpful capital, partnerships, or support that could strengthen my business?
  • • How would my day-to-day responsibilities change if I had the resources to hire or systematize key functions that currently consume my time?
  • • What is one role, system, or capability I should seriously consider funding externally so I can focus more on strategy and less on daily firefighting?
5

Acknowledge the role of timing and luck, but position yourself to ride favorable waves by watching structural trends and aligning your model with them.

Reflection Questions:

  • • What macro trends (in demographics, regulation, construction, technology, etc.) are influencing my industry that I might be underestimating?
  • • How could I adjust my strategy to better align with one or two long-term tailwinds, rather than fighting against them?
  • • What specific information sources or routines can I adopt to keep myself aware of structural shifts so I can spot the next "wave" to ride?

Episode Summary - Notes by Dakota

Pressbox and Tide Cleaners: Vijen Patel. The $1.99 Gamble That Built a National Brand
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