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TED Talks Daily

Inside the Gaza peace plan | Ian Bremmer

with Ian Bremmer

Published October 7, 2025
View Show Notes

About This Episode

On the second anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel, political scientist Ian Bremmer speaks with Helen Walters about a new 20‑point peace plan announced by U.S. President Trump to end the Gaza war. They examine the behind‑the‑scenes diplomacy with Gulf states, the leverage Washington is now exerting on Israel, the proposed interim governance structure for Gaza, and the fading prospects of a Palestinian state. Bremmer outlines what Hamas, Israel, and regional actors would need to agree to, as well as the risks, timelines, and political consequences that could cause the plan to collapse.

Topics Covered

Israel-Palestine conflict War and empire Economic sanctions Iran Ukraine Nuclear weapons U.S. politics and elections Middle East peace negotiations

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Quick Takeaways

  • Bremmer argues that the new 20‑point peace plan backed by the U.S., Gulf states, Europeans, and accepted in principle by Israel marks the most promising moment for ending the Gaza war in two years, though success is far from guaranteed.
  • A key shift is President Trump's willingness to use U.S. leverage over Israel, including forcing Netanyahu to abandon annexation plans and apologize to Qatar, demonstrating that Washington is now imposing real constraints on Israeli actions.
  • Under the proposed framework, Hamas would disarm and be excluded from Gaza's post‑war governance, which would be run by a technocratic Palestinian body approved and funded largely by Gulf states, with security provided by Egypt and possibly UN peacekeepers.
  • Bremmer believes the prospect of a fully sovereign Palestinian state is now effectively dead due to overwhelming Israeli public and governmental opposition, even though the plan references statehood in principle.
  • He describes the emerging model as a constrained, externally supervised Palestinian governance structure that prioritizes ending the war and restoring basic services rather than achieving immediate statehood.
  • International consequences for Israel over the war have been limited so far, but U.S. actions in the last weeks-including blocking annexation and issuing security guarantees to Qatar-show that Washington is willing to curtail Israeli autonomy when core interests are at stake.
  • Hamas' status as a weakened actor with little to lose, combined with its reliance on hostages as leverage, makes it unpredictable and potentially unwilling to finalize a deal even if the framework appears acceptable on paper.
  • Bremmer warns that if key details-hostage release, Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal phases-are not resolved within weeks, the bombing is likely to resume and the current diplomatic window could close.

Podcast Notes

Introduction and context of the Gaza conflict and new peace plan

TED Talks Daily setup and framing

Host Elise Hu introduces the episode as part of TED Talks Daily, noting it brings new ideas daily[2:27]
She notes October 7 marks the two‑year anniversary of Hamas attacks on Israel and the start of a devastating conflict in the region[2:34]
She poses the central question: what might happen next in the conflict?[2:46]
Elise introduces Ian Bremmer as a political scientist and president and founder of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, in conversation with TED's head of media and curation, Helen Walters[2:51]

Launch of TED Explains the World segment

Helen welcomes listeners to another episode of TED Explains the World with geopolitical expert Ian Bremmer[3:01]
She states the date as October 6, 2025, and notes it is the week of the second anniversary of Hamas's attack and Israel's devastating response[3:18]
Helen explains that the previous week, U.S. President Trump announced a 20‑point plan to end the conflict[3:26]
She says the deal has been accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and that Hamas says it accepts parts of the ceasefire and hostage‑release plan and is ready to negotiate the rest[3:33]
Helen frames the key question: could this be a turning point toward peace?[3:43]

Ian Bremmer's initial assessment of the peace plan

Ian says the situation is more positive today than a week earlier[3:56]
• He cites that Israel had been moving toward announcing annexation in the West Bank, and that is now off the table under the new dynamic
• He notes the U.S. had supported an earlier Gaza governance plan that would have led to the removal of many Palestinians from Gaza, but that is no longer the plan
He says there is now a plan endorsed by Gulf states, Europeans, the U.S., and in principle mostly by Israel, and they are now waiting on Hamas[4:32]
Ian calls this significant progress and says there is more reason for optimism than at any point in the last two years, though he stops short of saying there is clear reason for optimism overall[5:11]
He stresses that many things can still go wrong before reaching a final yes, so while it is real progress, there is not yet a deal[5:11]

Behind-the-scenes diplomacy shaping the 20-point plan

Gulf summit with President Trump and its impact

Ian describes a recent summit meeting between Gulf state leaders and President Trump as very productive and warm[5:56]
• He notes these Gulf leaders are among those Trump is personally closest to, and also close to Trump's family members such as Jared and trusted advisers like Steve Witkoff
• He says they are politically very aligned in the near and medium term, and the summit led to real progress
Ian links this summit to a shift in Trump's attitude toward Israel's actions in Qatar[6:45]
• He explains Trump had irritation and even anger at Israel's decision to strike political leaders of Hamas while they were on Qatari territory, a U.S. ally
• The summit contributed to an agreement on the peace plan that was later announced between the U.S. and Israel in the Oval Office and accepted by Netanyahu

U.S. leverage over Israel and shift from unilateralism

Ian says Trump has a lot of leverage over Israel and until recently had been reluctant to use it[7:56]
He characterizes both Trump and Netanyahu as having often acted unilaterally on critical regional issues[7:56]
• He recalls Trump engaging in bilateral negotiations with Iran without seeking Israel's permission or advance coordination
• He notes Trump directly authorized negotiations with Hamas to get an American hostage released, again without coordinating with Israel
• On the Israeli side, Ian notes Netanyahu has acted unilaterally in strikes against Iran and Hamas leaders in Qatar and elsewhere
Ian argues that, until the last couple of weeks, Netanyahu's unilateral actions had not produced meaningful consequences from the U.S.[9:04]
He says that has now changed, with Trump starting to deploy American leverage against Israel to force policy changes[9:33]
• Examples include forcing Israel to apologize to the Emir of Qatar and accept a 20‑point plan, with some changes negotiated back and forth between Trump and Netanyahu
Ian compares this to Trump's earlier use of leverage on Ukraine's President Zelensky over a critical minerals deal, where Trump showed willingness to suspend intelligence sharing[9:49]
• He says in those situations Trump had the cards and the other leaders did not, which he likens to Trump's current leverage over Netanyahu
Ian stresses that Netanyahu needs Trump for ongoing election support and national security in ways Trump does not need Netanyahu, despite Trump's personal alignment with Israel[10:15]
He summarizes that behind-the-scenes dynamics are primarily about U.S.-Gulf relations and the U.S.-Israel, specifically U.S.-Netanyahu, relationship[10:26]

Ongoing talks and structure of the emerging peace process

Current negotiations in Egypt

Ian notes that as they speak (a Monday), talks are underway in Egypt between the U.S., Israel, and Hamas, mediated by Egyptians and others[11:02]
• He says by the time the episode airs, there will likely be more information on how successful those talks have been
He explains the task is to bridge the gap between the 20‑point plan Israel accepted and a separate agreement in principle that Hamas accepted[11:26]
• He notes the Hamas statement was not the same as the Israeli plan, but Trump immediately framed Hamas as wanting peace and told Israel to stop bombing
• He says Israel largely stopped bombing and is now at the table trying to reconcile areas where both sides say they agree but actually differ in details
Ian emphasizes that many detailed issues remain, requiring the U.S. to use leverage over Israel and whatever influence it can muster with Hamas[12:06]
He characterizes Hamas as increasingly acting like "dead-enders" who have little trust in anyone and face assassination and possible organizational destruction[12:12]
• Because Hamas leaders feel they have less to lose, he argues they are harder to push over the finish line of a deal and remain very dangerous

Post-war leadership and governance of Gaza under the plan

Future of Hamas and Palestinian leadership

Ian states that if Hamas disarms, it will not be part of Gaza's reconstruction or governance[12:48]
• He says this exclusion is a condition accepted by everyone except Hamas itself; no external party wants Hamas involved in post‑war governance
He clarifies that even if radicals continue to exist or morph into new organizations hostile to Israel, they will not be part of official Palestinian governance[13:28]

Outline of proposed Gaza governance model

Ian says that once a ceasefire is agreed, Palestinian governance in Gaza is expected to morph into a technocratic group installed with U.S. and Gulf approval[13:28]
• He notes funding will come mostly from Gulf states, and the administration in the near term may be led by Tony Blair as a temporary governor
• He explains Blair has strong support from Trump, Jared Kushner, and Gulf leaders, and has been working with the Gulf at the highest levels for over a decade
Security under this model would not be provided by Palestinians, but likely by Egyptians and possibly UN peacekeepers, again funded by Gulf states[14:16]
Ian stresses this is not a Palestinian state; it is a governance model without elections, staffed by Palestinians deemed trusted and capable at delivering basic reconstruction and services[14:38]
• He underlines that security and many key levers would remain in the hands of non‑Palestinian actors during this interim period
He argues that, given what has happened over the past two years, this arrangement would be the best possible near‑term outcome if it can be implemented[14:58]
Ian notes that this is why a wide range of actors-the Europeans, UK, Canada, Japan, the U.S. (including many Democrats), and the Gulf states-have lined up in support of the deal[15:16]
• He says these actors see no other viable way forward that ends the war and begins reconstruction at this stage

Comparison with earlier Trump ideas like turning Gaza into a Riviera

Ian recalls that months earlier, Trump floated a plan with the Jordanian king present about making Gaza into a kind of Mediterranean Riviera with Palestinians leaving and Gulf states building it out[15:35]
He says that earlier vision was never going to be accepted and has now been completely discarded by Trump[15:48]
Ian calls Trump's ability to drop failed ideas and behave as though he never proposed them a political skill that is now helping progress toward a more realistic deal[15:56]

Concerns about external control and lack of Palestinian leadership in initial governance

Helen's skepticism about outsider-led governance

Helen notes the governance body is being called a board of peace and highlights it would be led by Tony Blair (a Brit), backed by Americans, and not run by people directly from the affected region[16:30]
She observes that similar externally driven governance experiments have been tried elsewhere and not gone well[16:26]
Helen asks why including Palestinians from the start is not a baseline condition, and whether that omission undermines legitimacy[16:56]

Ian's rationale for a technocratic interim with limited Palestinian leadership at the top

Ian answers that external actors cannot agree on who the initial Palestinian leader should be, and picking Palestinians to be fully in charge from day one would make consensus much harder[17:12]
He frames the proposed setup as a pragmatic compromise rather than an ideal or permanent solution[17:26]
• He stresses he is not claiming it is ideal, permanent, or the likely structure in a year, only that it is what can get everyone on board now
Ian emphasizes that if Gulf states are paying, Americans are doing diplomatic heavy lifting, and the arrangement ends the war, that outcome must be weighed against the current humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza[17:37]
• He points to humanitarian aid blockades, 2 million Palestinians in extreme conditions, and deaths from starvation and ongoing bombardment, including many civilians
He says that before talking about "good governance" or a state, the first priority is to end the war and allow Palestinians to survive and regain access to education and medical care[18:19]

Prospects for a Palestinian state under the current plan

Two-state solution as principle versus reality

Ian notes that it is important that a two-state solution still exists at least in principle[19:16]
• He points out that around 150 countries, including a majority of American allies, have recognized Palestine as a state that does not actually exist in practice
He underscores that Israeli public opinion and government do not support a Palestinian state[19:37]
He says the current plan does not slam the door on a future state but makes it very difficult and indeterminate, and that Gulf states are willing to fund the arrangement without more specificity[19:52]
Ian states bluntly that he believes a Palestinian state is functionally dead and calls that a great misfortune[19:52]
• He compares this to Ukraine's situation, arguing it is also functionally impossible for Ukraine to regain all its territory, even though they deserve to and Palestinians likewise deserve a state

Helen's question on alternatives to statehood

Helen notes that mention of Palestinian statehood in the 20‑point plan surprised her, even though there is no roadmap, and she asks what the alternative is if statehood is not granted[21:15]

Constraints imposed by Israeli veto power and regional bargaining

Ian explains that Saudi Arabia pushed hard in private meetings with Trump and his advisers for a two‑year timeframe toward a Palestinian state but could only secure a vague acceptance in principle[21:31]
He recalls that Trump wanted a Palestinian state in his first term, leading to the Abraham Accords, but in recent months Trump publicly declared that time had passed and he no longer supported a Palestinian state[21:13]
Ian says Trump is now at least open in principle to a state if multiple hurdles are passed, but stresses the reality is that Israel has a de facto veto via its military dominance[21:50]
• He lists places where Israeli military dominance shapes outcomes: Gaza and other territories belonging to adversaries including parts of Syria, Iran, Yemen, and southern Lebanon
He argues that as long as Israelis refuse to allow a Palestinian state, and given that only a small minority support it, no successor government to Netanyahu is likely to endorse statehood either[21:28]
Ian therefore does not see a Palestinian state happening and instead envisions a limited local governance model[22:00]

Description of a "halfway house" governance model

Ian describes a likely outcome as a halfway arrangement where local Palestinians control parts of the bureaucracy, civil society, aid distribution, and sectors like hospitals[22:08]
• However, he notes they may not control a military, may or may not control policing, and will not fully control border security or international representation
He says such an arrangement would feel state-like in some functions but would not be a true state under international norms[23:00]
The key distinction, he argues, is that external overseers would not be Israel but other actors not seen as enemies by Palestinians on the ground, which is central to this ceasefire-to-peace transition[23:20]

Consequences for Israel and Netanyahu from the war and U.S. pressure

Limited international consequences so far

Helen notes many people describe the conditions faced by Palestinians as genocide and asks whether there are consequences for Netanyahu or Israel[27:37]
Ian replies that consequences for Israel have so far been limited[27:48]
• He mentions that some countries have recognized a Palestinian state and that Norway's sovereign wealth fund has divested certain Israeli investments, with some potential impact on shareholder value
He notes the war itself has had substantial economic costs for Israel, with many skilled workers mobilized or doing double duty, leading to the weakest growth and productivity in decades outside the pandemic period[28:05]

Growing potential for more severe pressure, especially via the U.S.

Ian says that in the last two weeks, the potential for more severe consequences has increased[29:09]
He describes Emirati red lines from the Abraham Accords: if a two-state solution is destroyed via annexation or Gaza occupation leading to Palestinian removal, they would exit the Accords[29:21]
• After meeting Emirati leadership, Trump publicly declared that annexation would not be accepted and would not occur, effectively overruling Netanyahu on that sovereign decision
Ian notes that while Netanyahu and his cabinet were prepared to move toward annexation, Trump asserted decisive authority, which he calls a big deal[29:34]

Netanyahu's forced apology to Qatar and U.S. guarantees

Ian recounts Netanyahu's visit to the White House, where he read a letter that was actually an apology to the Qatari emir[30:19]
• He explains that letter was drafted by Qatar at Trump's request, then handed to Netanyahu in the Oval Office while Trump was on the phone with the emir
• A senior advisor to the Qatari prime minister was physically present in the Oval Office watching Netanyahu read the apology, which Ian calls a humiliation for the Israeli prime minister
Ian interprets this as Trump declaring that Israel did not have sovereign freedom to attack Hamas political leaders in Qatar and extracting a promise not to repeat such actions[31:09]
He adds that Trump issued an unprecedented executive order pledging economic, diplomatic, and, if necessary, military U.S. support to defend Qatar against any attack[31:19]
He concludes that Trump has imposed direct consequences limiting Israeli sovereignty in certain domains[31:49]

Potential European and global isolation versus relief from pressure

Ian notes additional potential pressure from Europe, such as talk of expelling Israel from Eurovision or FIFA competitions and of sanctions or visa restrictions[32:32]
• He says these steps could make Israelis feel isolated and view Netanyahu as steering Israel toward treatment similar to how Europe treated apartheid-era South Africa
However, he argues that Israel's acceptance of the peace plan significantly reduces that imminent pressure[33:25]
If Hamas accepts the deal, Israel could move toward a more normalized, stable relationship with Europe, even if not returning to prior "good graces"[33:43]
If Hamas refuses, Ian says Hamas will be blamed for the deal's collapse, further insulating Israel from some international backlash[33:49]
He concludes that meaningful consequences have thus far come primarily from the United States rather than other actors[34:02]

Netanyahu's political position and constraints

Helen asks what Netanyahu does next given the humiliation and internal pressures from many factions within the Israeli government[34:24]
Ian says Netanyahu has no choice but to "take the win" if the deal goes forward[35:32]
• He references reporting that Trump told Netanyahu he was too negative and should recognize this as a win
He notes Trump is also publicly granting Hamas a level of credibility unusual for a U.S. president because he wants the deal to succeed[35:11]
If Hamas drags its feet or refuses to implement, Ian expects Netanyahu will act to scuttle the deal and the situation will revert to a modified status quo, with some new constraints but not major ones[35:12]
If the deal is implemented, Ian believes Netanyahu will have to accept it and operate with clipped wings, being more careful with the American president than in past relationships with U.S. leaders[35:57]
He reviews Netanyahu's long history of savvy dealings with U.S. presidents and notes that despite low approval ratings, Israel's multi‑party system allows him to maintain a coalition with the far right[36:20]
• He lists Netanyahu's claimed military successes: severely damaging Hezbollah, killing Hamas's military leadership (though not political leaders), and rolling back Iran's nuclear capabilities by an estimated 18-24 months
• He adds that Netanyahu has enabled settlers in the West Bank to continue incremental, illegal annexation without formal legal recognition
Ian argues Netanyahu is not in a weak position and has tied himself to a religious fundamentalist, far‑right vision of a Greater Israel as the price of staying in power and avoiding jail[37:25]
He muses that it would be useful for Israel if a deal could be cut to guarantee Netanyahu and his family's safety and well‑being after leaving power, realigning his incentives with the country's long‑term interests[38:19]
• He admits he does not see such a deal happening but identifies this misalignment as a structural problem for Israel's politics

Implementation hurdles: hostages, disarmament, withdrawal, and timeline

Key deal requirements on Hamas and Israel

Ian says the 20‑point plan requires all hostages to be released within three days of a final agreement[39:10]
He notes Hamas has in principle agreed to that formula but insists on certain unspecified conditions on the ground[39:19]
• He points out that once the 48 remaining hostages are released, Hamas loses its core leverage, which it has relied on throughout the conflict
He raises the question of whether Hamas will truly agree to release hostages and what conditions Israel can accept in return[39:56]
Ian highlights Hamas disarmament as another central question, noting Israel's longstanding demand to dismember Hamas[40:05]
• He asks what disarmament would actually look like, how and when it would occur, and recalls that Hamas has historically tied disarmament to the creation of a Palestinian state, which is not on the table now
He says it is unclear whether actual disarmament will occur and under what conditions[40:23]
Ian adds that Hamas must also accept exclusion from any Gaza governance, something they have not yet formally agreed to, even though he assumes they ultimately will[40:31]
On the Israeli side, he notes there are questions about the timing and extent of Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza[40:51]
• He references a White House map outlining phased withdrawals: first from about half of Gaza, and by the final phase, leaving Israel in control of roughly 15 percent as a buffer zone not previously held
He says all these elements-hostage release, Hamas disarmament, exclusion from governance, and Israeli withdrawal-must be resolved before a durable ceasefire and peace can take hold[41:02]

Time pressure and risk of return to war

Helen asks about the timeline, noting Trump initially wanted an answer within three days and that deadline has already passed[41:54]
Ian quips that Trump often uses "two weeks" as a preferred timeline, which then extends, but says this situation carries real urgency because the world is paying close attention[42:14]
He believes Hamas will have to agree relatively quickly, though not necessarily within three days, and can meanwhile send positive signals about the plan and Trump's peacemaking role[41:54]
He argues the process cannot drag on for months; instead, he expects a window of days to a few weeks[42:32]
Ian warns that if implementation is still unresolved in two to four weeks, the war is likely to resume with Israeli bombing restarting[42:39]
• At that point, questions would arise about whether all hostages can be found and the entire diplomatic process could collapse
He describes the coming period as very tense and intense, with Trump and his team applying substantial effort to reach yes[42:56]
Ian concludes that there are still many ways for the plan to blow up, and he would not confidently bet on success despite relative optimism compared with the previous two years[43:17]

Closing remarks

Hopes for peace and gratitude

Helen says she hopes the deal does not blow up and that peace becomes reality, thanking Ian for his candid explanation and guidance on what to watch[43:25]
Ian responds warmly and the conversation ends[43:34]

TED Talks Daily outro

The narrator notes this was the latest episode of TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer and credits the production team of TED Talks Daily[43:49]

Lessons Learned

Actionable insights and wisdom you can apply to your business, career, and personal life.

1

Effective peace negotiations often depend less on ideal outcomes and more on what key power brokers are actually willing and able to enforce with their leverage.

Reflection Questions:

  • • Where in your work or life are you pushing for an ideal outcome that key decision-makers are not realistically willing to support?
  • • How could you better map who truly holds leverage in a situation you care about, and what they are actually prepared to do?
  • • What is one negotiation or conflict you are involved in where reframing your goal around enforceable commitments, rather than ideals, would change your strategy this week?
2

Interim, imperfect governance structures can be valuable stepping stones when the alternative is prolonged chaos, even if they fall far short of long-term justice or sovereignty.

Reflection Questions:

  • • In a project or organization you are part of, where might a temporary, "good enough" structure be preferable to waiting for a perfect but unlikely solution?
  • • How do you currently balance urgency against idealism when deciding whether to support an imperfect compromise?
  • • What is one area of your life where accepting a transitional arrangement could relieve immediate suffering or risk while you work toward a better long-term outcome?
3

Domestic political incentives of leaders can diverge sharply from the long-term interests of their populations, and any strategy that ignores those incentives is likely to fail.

Reflection Questions:

  • • When you assess leaders (political, corporate, or otherwise), how often do you explicitly consider what they personally stand to gain or lose from each option?
  • • Where are you assuming that someone in authority is acting for the collective good when their incentives might actually push them elsewhere?
  • • What could you do in your own sphere of influence to better align decision-makers' incentives with the outcomes that benefit the broader group?
4

There are windows of opportunity in complex conflicts where attention, pressure, and alignment briefly converge; missing those windows can reset the system back to violence or stasis.

Reflection Questions:

  • • Looking at your current challenges, where do you see a narrow window of opportunity that may close if you do not act within weeks rather than months?
  • • How can you tell the difference between a temporary opening for change and a stable, long-term shift in conditions?
  • • What is one concrete step you could take in the next few days to capitalize on a favorable alignment of people, resources, or attention in your work or personal life?
5

Symbolic humiliations and public reversals can reshape power relationships, signalling who truly sets the rules even when formal sovereignty appears unchanged.

Reflection Questions:

  • • Have you observed situations where a public rebuke, apology, or reversal quietly changed who really had power, even if titles stayed the same?
  • • How might you be underestimating the impact of symbolic gestures-like who apologizes to whom-in negotiations or conflicts you follow?
  • • In your own leadership or collaborations, what small but visible act could you take to clarify roles, boundaries, or accountability without formally changing structures?

Episode Summary - Notes by Reese

Inside the Gaza peace plan | Ian Bremmer
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